

Property-driven Automatic Generation of Reduced-ISA Hardware

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Abstract—

As the diversity of computing workloads and customers continues to increase, so does the need to customize hardware at low cost for different computing needs. This work focuses on automatic customization of a given hardware, available as a soft or firm IP, through eliminating unneeded or undesired instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions. We present a property-based framework for automatically generating reduced-ISA hardware. Our framework directly operates on a given arbitrary RTL or gate-level netlist, uses property checking to identify gates that are guaranteed to not toggle if only a reduced ISA needs to be supported, and automatically eliminates these untoggable gates to generate a new design. We show a 14% gate count reduction when the Ibex [19] core is optimized using our framework for the instructions required by a set of embedded (MiBench) workloads. Reduced-ISA versions generated by our framework that support a limited set of ISA extensions and which cannot be generated using Ibex’s parameterization options provide 10%-47% gate count reduction. For an obfuscated Cortex M0 netlist optimized to support the instructions in the MiBench benchmarks, we observe a 20% area reduction and 18% gate count reduction compared to the baseline core, demonstrating applicability of our framework to obfuscated designs. We demonstrate the scalability of our approach by applying our framework to a 100,000-gate RIDECORE [21] design, showing a 14%-17% gate count reduction.

I. INTRODUCTION

The ever-increasing diversity in the needs of different customers and applications that use the same microprocessor or accelerator design (as a soft or firm IP, for example) has researchers and vendors looking for low-cost approaches to customize hardware designs for different needs [10], [17]. Ability to customize computing hardware at low cost improves computing efficiency for end customers by reducing unnecessary delay, area, and power costs. Low-cost customizability also makes it easier to react to any performance or correctness bugs or security vulnerabilities discovered after a design is finalized.

This work focuses on automatic customization of a given hardware design (RTL or gate-level netlist, obfuscated or open) available as a soft or firm IP, through instruction set architecture (ISA) trimming. We observe (Section VII) that eliminating support for unneeded or undesired instructions from a microprocessor design can generate significant efficiency benefits. An instruction may be unneeded due to the characteristics of target workloads (especially in an embedded setting) or ISA aging [18]. Similarly, an instruction may be undesired due to high implementation cost, a security vulnerability it may cause, or a bug/error in its implementation. The ability to *automatically* customize a processor core for a specified ISA subset can also aid generation of multi-ISA heterogeneous multi-core designs [15], where ISAs of the different cores correspond to different subsets of the same composite or base ISA.

Some existing designs support ISA customization in a limited fashion. If RTL is available, support for some instruction set extensions can be removed easily in some modularly-implemented designs, especially for modular ISAs such as RISC-V. For example, the Ibex core RTL [19] uses elaboration time parameters to disable some of the RISC-V ISA extensions it implements. However, a modular ISA does not imply a modular implementation of that ISA. Unless the implementation is truly modular at the extension-level, support

for arbitrary individual extensions cannot be easily removed. For example, Ibex does not support core configurations without the *c*, *Zicsr*, or *Zifencei* ISA extensions. Ibex implementation of these extensions contains logic that is tightly coupled with that of other instructions.

Removing support for only a subset of an ISA extension or the base ISA is even harder (even for a modular ISA such as RISC-V) and requires instruction-level modularity in implementation. Consider the case where we want to remove the division instructions, but not the multiply instructions of the RV32m extension [24]. Since RISC-V does not provide this level of modularization, we have no option but to directly modify the RTL to remove those instructions. This also requires global awareness of the design to ensure that requisite changes are made to all impacted components, including the decoder, the execution unit, and the distributed logic of the stall controller. This process is error prone and potentially time-consuming. We are unaware of any RISC-V core design that implements *instruction-level modularity*.

Furthermore, many popular ISAs are *not* modular! For example, the openMSP430 open-source implementation of the MSP430 microcontroller provides no option for removing support for instructions, grouped in extension or otherwise, largely because the MSP430 ISA itself is not modular. Similarly, the ARMv6-M architecture of the Cortex M0 and M1 series microprocessors is not modular. It is unclear how to remove support for unneeded or undesired instructions from these IPs without a manual, intrusive, globally-aware and error-prone change to the RTL. Finally, above methods largely do not work if RTL is not available.




Fig. 1. The proposed framework automatically trims a given soft or firm IP by eliminating hardware overhead for unneeded or undesired instructions.

In this work, we develop a property-driven framework (Figure 1) for automatically generating hardware for a specified reduced ISA from the base RTL or gate-level netlist (which is how soft and firm IPs are usually available). At high level, the framework allows for specification of a rich set of constraints to the base design, expressed as temporal logic formulas [14]. We attach to every gate (or an RTL module) a property that is checked under the constraint(s). An action – e.g., removal of gates from the base design – is taken if a property is proved to hold. In the specific context explored here, the ISA subset that does not need to be supported (identified through

profiling, testing, or in field) is expressed as a constraint to the base design’s execution environment. For every gate, property checking [1] is used to check for *gate invariants*, such as whether or not a gate’s output is constant when the specified ISA subset is not supported. If it is proved that a gate’s output is constant, the net attached to the gate’s output is detached from the gate and assigned to its constant value. The design is then re-synthesized, eliminating the unneeded gate (and potentially eliminating or optimizing many more). Our approach is largely black box (i.e., requires limited knowledge or understanding of the microarchitecture implemented by the RTL or the gate-level netlist), is compatible with any synthesis flow, is applicable to arbitrary processor and accelerator designs (indeed to an arbitrary synchronous circuit), and can eliminate arbitrary instructions in the ISA, including base-ISA instructions. Indeed, we show that our approach applies even to obfuscated cores (Section VII-B), although obfuscation may impact the area and gate-count reduction achieved. To the best of our knowledge, this is first such framework for automated generation of reduced-ISA hardware.

II. RELATED WORK

A large body of work exists on application-specific instruction processors (ASIPs) and extensible processors. Tensilica’s Xtensa processors [5], for example, allowed user-specified extensions (using TiE) to the Xtensa base instruction set using automated customization tools. ARC [4] allowed designers to add custom instructions using ARChitect Processor Configurator. Several MIPS processors allow application-specific extensions [25]. ARM recently announced Arm Custom Instructions and associated software development tools [17]. Codasip [10] allows optional or custom hardware extensions to a RISC-V core supporting the standard ISA.

Our work differs in three important aspects. First, previous works are focused on allowing new instructions to be *added* to a design that implements at least a base or standard ISA. We are focused instead on automatically *removing* hardware support for instructions, including instructions in the base ISA. Second, prior automatic customization frameworks are tied to a given design. For example, Codasip supplies its own RISC-V cores as modifiable CodAL models (Codasip’s processor-modeling language), which can then be customized using Codasip’s tools (e.g., Codasip Studio). Tools from Tensilica, MIPS, and ARC were similarly specific to their own processors. Our framework takes as an input an *arbitrary* design, including even gate-level netlists and obfuscated designs, and generates its reduced-ISA version automatically. Third, prior frameworks are primarily based on parameterization and metaprogramming. Our approach is fundamentally different; we identify gates in the original design that are not needed for the specified reduced-ISA subset and then eliminate them automatically.

There is some work demonstrating that reducing supported ISA can lead to efficiency benefits [15]. However, these works do not show *how* to generate reduced-ISA hardware. We present an approach that can automatically generate reduced-ISA hardware starting with a given arbitrary base design.

Recent work automatically generates a bespoke design customized for a given application program binary [2]. The resulting design is not guaranteed to execute correctly any other program binary. Our focus is automatically generating a reduced ISA design. The resulting design can support arbitrary applications that use the reduced ISA.

Finally, property checking has had a rich history in hardware verification [3]. There has also been some work on synthesizing property checks directly into hardware [8]. We use property checking directly in the hardware synthesis flow to perform automated hardware transformations, specifically focused on automatic generation

of reduced-ISA hardware. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of property checking in automating hardware optimization.

III. MOTIVATION

Consider an embedded setting in which a core targets a fixed set of workloads. Table I shows the number of instructions that are supported by the Ibex RISC-V core, as well as the number of RISC-V instructions used across several embedded (MiBench) benchmark groups [6] compiled to RISC-V using gcc 9.2.0. Each group (i.e., networking, security, automotive) uses only a fraction of the instructions supported by the Ibex core. In fact, only 68% of the base ISA is used to support all the groups. This suggests that there may be significant opportunity to customize the Ibex core for a reduced ISA if the goal is to target only a small number of applications in an embedded setting. Table I shows that the opportunity may be even greater for the Cortex-M0 core, since only 60% of the ARMv6-M base ISA is used to support all the groups; higher opportunity stems from a richer base ISA (ARMv6-M), with 83 instructions (vs 78 instructions supported by Ibex).

Similar opportunity exists when an IP is used in a (likely embedded) setting where a subset of supported extensions is not needed. Table I shows that the number of instructions supported by Ibex implementing different RISC-V ISA extensions can vary by almost 2×. The variation can reach 4× for IPs that implement more extensions than Ibex (e.g., Ibex does not implement floating point or atomics extensions). The ability to easily transform an IP for a reduced-ISA variant could lead to significant benefits.

Ability to automatically generate reduced-ISA hardware may be useful also to eliminate support for deprecated or rarely-used instructions. A study of x86 applications showed that more than 500 instructions were never used [18], and thus contribute unnecessary overhead. A reduced-ISA hardware can eliminate this overhead by removing support for rarely-used instructions.

Motivation also exists in terms of trustworthy execution. Instructions are often diagnosed (post-design or in-field) as having buggy implementation – one need only look at errata sheets for processors – or as causing security vulnerabilities. Notorious examples include correctness or security vulnerabilities due to FDIV [22], TSX instructions [12], RDRAND and RDSEED [11], SWAPGS [20], etc. Eliminating support for these instructions from an existing IP may fix the bug or vulnerability and increase efficiency at the same time, without requiring intrusive hardware changes. In some instances, this may be a feasible, interim solution before a significant microarchitecture re-design can be done. The approach is particularly attractive when a microcode ROM – which can be used to eliminate support for instructions by changing the microcode – is not available (embedded microcontrollers are often not microcoded) or when a change in the microcode cannot fix the problem [9]. In some embedded settings, a reduced-ISA IP may also be desirable to preventively eliminate instructions that may cause security vulnerabilities (e.g., indirect jumps – exploits due to indirect jumps are well known [23]) or whose implementation may not have been fully verified [22].

Finally, some instructions may be diagnosed in the field as being expensive (e.g., several AVX instructions were discovered to routinely cause voltage emergencies leading to large performance degradation [7]). Such instructions can be automatically eliminated from the IP through automatic generation of reduced-ISA hardware.

IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

Inputs to the proposed Property-Driven Automatic Transformation (PDAT) framework, described in Figure 2, are (a) a gate-level netlist for the sequential digital circuit design, synthesized to either

TABLE I

NUMBER OF INSTRUCTIONS USED BY DIFFERENT MiBENCH BENCHMARK GROUPS FOR IBEX AND CORTEX M0 CORES.

Ibex		MiBench Benchmarks			
ISA Extension	Supported	Networking	Security	Automotive	Total
RV32i base	40	18	24	28	29
M-Extension	8	2	0	3	4
C-Extension	23	13	18	19	20
Zicr-Extension	7	0	0	0	0
Total	78	33	42	50	53
Cortex M0		MiBench Benchmarks			
ISA	Supported	Networking	Security	Automotive	Total
ARMv6-M	83	33	40	48	50

a physical standard cell library or a logical standard cell library (e.g., GTech), which is annotated with elements of (b) a Property Library which contains properties that capture invariants about gates, and (c) a collection of restrictions to the execution environment which ensure that only desired instructions are by the property checker.

1) *Property Library*: The Property Library we use in our analysis is written in SystemVerilog, and its properties are expressed as SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA). An example property module from this library is depicted in Listing 1. Property modules are bound to each instance of the associated cell-type in the netlist (e.g., the module `and2_properties` is bound to each two-input AND gate in the netlist). The properties check for semantically-meaningful invariants on the gate inputs and outputs in what we term *gate-level property checking*. For example, the property `and_in_A2_A1` checks that if the cell’s A1 input is \top , then so is the cell’s A2 input (at all times and in every possible execution). If this property is satisfied, then it means that the associated cell can be rewired by assigning its output to the net driving A1, without impacting the functional behavior of the design. An advantage of property checking at the gate level, as opposed to a higher level of abstraction, is that the Property Libraries can be used to enable optimizations for any design synthesized to a standard cell library, including designs for which the microarchitecture is not known/understood (e.g., obfuscated designs).

2) *Annotated Netlist*: We annotate the IP’s netlist with properties from the Property Library. Each gate in the netlist has bound to it an instance of the appropriate property module (e.g., a copy of `and2_properties` is bound to each AND2 gate in the netlist). Thus for each gate in the annotated netlist, there are one or more asserted properties.

3) *Environment Restrictions*: We use ‘environment restrictions’ to constrain the property checking effort to consider all programs from the targeted ISA subset and only programs from the targeted ISA subset. Environment restrictions are expressed as SVA properties. Environment restrictions also manage memory reads and writes and constrain the netlist’s primary inputs.

Listing 1

AN EXAMPLE PROPERTY MODULE FOR A TWO-INPUT AND GATE.

```

1 module and2_properties(input A1, A2, ZN);
2   default clocking @(Sglobal_clock); endclocking
3   default disable iff (1'b0);
4   and_out_ZN_0: assert property (ZN == 1'b0);
5   and_out_ZN_1: assert property (ZN == 1'b1);
6   and_in_A2_A1: assert property (A1 => A2);
7   and_in_A1_A2: assert property (A2 => A1);
8 endmodule

```

Figure 3 depicts the versatility of this approach. We can encode ISA restrictions (e.g., removal of instructions, removal of ISA extensions), restrictions on I/O protocols (e.g., bounded or deterministic memory latencies), explicit mapping of specific code sequences to address regions (e.g., reset handlers, trap vectors, entire programs, or operating system code), etc.

A. Property Checking Stage

This is the first and generally most time-consuming stage of the PDAT pipeline. The property checker takes the annotated netlist, property library, and environment restrictions as inputs, and checks to see if the properties hold or are violated by allowed executions. Property checking produces a list of properties that are proved to hold on all allowed executions. In our work, we use Mentor’s Questa Formal software as the property checker.

B. Netlist Rewiring Stage

In this stage of the PDAT pipeline, the original netlist is rewired based on the list of proved properties created in the Property Checking Stage. Note that by limiting this stage to rewiring, we do not remove, transform, or add any cells in the netlist. This stage simply modifies cell port listings and adds assignment statements to the netlist. The rewired netlist is passed to the next stage of the PDAT pipeline for further optimization. If no invariants about a cell were proved during the property checker pipeline stage, then that cell is not changed during this stage.

C. Logic Resynthesis Stage

The rewired netlist is resynthesized using a standard synthesis flow. We rely on logic synthesis to remove and simplify constrained cells, since logic synthesis tools are ostensibly very good at this. This stage produces a transformed netlist, which is optimized with respect to the execution environment.

V. GENERATING A REDUCED-ISA DESIGN USING PDAT

We present an illustrative example of PDAT’s capabilities by using it to generate a reduced-ISA design from a core (such as RIDECORE) implementing the RISC-V RV32i ISA [24], which consists of four-byte instructions. First, we encode ISA instructions as properties, as shown in Listing 2 – lines 2 to 11. For example, beginning on line 2, we define a property which ensures that a 32-bit instruction is formatted as a load-upper immediate (LUI) instruction. The LUI instruction has three fields: a 7-bit opcode in the least significant bits, a 5-bit destination register, and a 20-bit immediate value. Since these last two fields may take any arbitrary value, we leave them unspecified. We then use these properties to restrict the execution environment of the core. We place these restrictions directly onto the instruction port.

Listing 2

PACKAGE OF SVA PROPERTIES FOR ANALYSIS OF A MICROPROCESSOR CORE IMPLEMENTING THE RV32I ISA.

```

1 package rv32i_pkg;
2 property \lui (logic [31:0] instr);
3   instr[6:0] == op_lui;
4 endproperty
5 property \auipc (logic [31:0] instr);
6   instr[6:0] == op_auipc;
7 endproperty
8 // ...
9 property \ebreak (logic [31:0] instr);
10  instr == 32'h0010_0073;
11 endproperty

13 property rv32i_all (logic [31:0] instr);
14   \lui (instr) or
15   \auipc (instr) or
16   // ...
17   \ebreak (instr);
18 endproperty
19 property unwanted (logic [31:0] instr);
20   \jalr (instr) or
21   \fence (instr) or
22   \ecall (instr) or
23   \ebreak (instr);
24 endproperty
25 endpackage

```

Listing 3 shows the PDAT input for the RV32i core instantiated as a top-level SystemVerilog module. The module’s ports, omitted for brevity, mimic those of the RISC-V core. In addition to instantiating




Fig. 2. The PDAT framework.




Fig. 3. A component-diagram of the PDAT input.

the core, in lines 14 and 15, we bind gate-level properties to every gate in the netlist, and in lines 7 to 12 we assume a property that forces `instr` to always be an instruction in the desired ISA subset. Once the top-level module is built, it is fed to the PDAT pipeline (as shown in Figure 2).

Listing 3
TOP-LEVEL MODULE FOR RV32I.

```

1  module rv32i_tb #(parameter pmem_size)
2  (
3      input CLK,
4      input var logic [31:0] instr, /* rest of netlist ports */
5  );
6  rv32i_core_netlist cua(.*) ;
7  as_inst_wanted: assume property (
8      @(posedge CLK)
9      disable iff (1'b0)
10     rv32i_pkg::rv32i_all(instr) and
11     not rv32i_pkg::unwanted(instr)
12 );
13 /* Example Checker module bindings */
14 bind AND2 and2_properties and2p(.*) ;
15 bind NOT not_properties notp(.*) ;
16 endmodule

```

The approach described above – using port-based constraints – is relatively straightforward for ISAs with fixed-width instructions, such as RV32i. However, many systems do not have fixed-width instructions. As such, in addition to *port-based constraints*, where constraints are placed on a core’s instruction memory port, we support *cutpoint-based constraints*, where constraints are placed on a core’s internal nets.

We define a *cutpoint* as a net whose value is determined by the property checking tool rather than its netlist drivers (so called because we are, in effect, *cutting* the net from its true driver). Cutpoints allow us to resolve a class of issues which arise as a result of variable-length instruction encoding and instruction caches. For example, a branch instruction may jump to an address which results in an instruction cache hit, however, with variable length instructions, there is no guarantee that the branch target address is an instruction boundary and not the middle of an instruction, which in turn, means the core may fetch an ‘instruction’ which is not part of the targeted ISA subset. If the netlist is not obfuscated (i.e., we have visibility into the netlist), we can insert a cutpoint somewhere in the design and then constrain its value in order to ensure that only instructions from the targeted ISA subset are decoded. Figure 4 shows how a cutpoint is used to place a valid, *aligned* instruction into the fetch-decode pipeline register, rather than the potentially *unaligned* instruction coming out of the instruction cache.




Fig. 4. For ISA subsets that include indirect jumps, we can use a cutpoint, allowing the property checker to directly drive internal circuit nets. This ensures that the core only *decodes* instructions from the targeted ISA subset, even if it potentially fetches instructions from outside the targeted ISA subset.

TABLE II
ARCHITECTURE AND MICROARCHITECTURE FEATURES OF IBEX,
RIDECORE, AND CORTEX M0.

Core	ISA	Stages	IW	ROB Size	BP	BTB Entries	Physical Registers	Gate Count
Ibex	RV32imcz	2 (3)	1	N/A	SNT	N/A	32	10k
RIDECORE	RV32im†	6	2	64	G-Share	8	96	100k
Cortex M0	ARMv6-m	3	1	N/A	SNT	N/A	16	10k

VI. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY

While the PDAT framework is general and can be applied even to CISC ISAs in non-embedded settings, the primary use case we explore in this work is embedded computing. We used three embedded-class cores for our evaluations (Table II). The first core, Ibex [19] (formerly zero-riscy), is a scalar, in-order, 32-bit RISC-V core that implements the *c*, *m*, *Zicsr*, and *Zifencei* extensions; we refer to the last two extensions collectively as the ‘z-extension’. We used the two-stage pipeline version of Ibex. IRQ and NMI interrupt lines were disabled for our analysis so that our results are conservative (since we do not count gates removed in the debug, watchdog, and interrupt logic from the baseline design). To avoid issues with misalignment and indirect branches, cutpoint-based constraints were used to generate reduced-ISA Ibex variants (see Section V). The second core, RIDECORE [21], is a two-way, out-of-order 32-bit RISC-V core that implements (most of) the RV32i base ISA, as well as the multiply instructions from the *m*-extension (though it does not implement hardware division or remainder instructions). Since RIDECORE has word-aligned instructions and does not allow branching to non-word-aligned addresses, we use port-based constraints to generate reduced-ISA designs. The third core, ARM’s Cortex M0 [16], is a three-stage core implementing the ARMv6-M ISA. The core has full support for ISR and exception handling. We analyze an obfuscated version of this core and place constraints directly on the ports to generate reduced-ISA designs (since, due to obfuscation, we cannot place constraints on pipeline registers as was done for Ibex).

We synthesized RTL and netlists into gate-level netlists using Synopsys Design Compiler. Compilation was done with the `-ungroup_all` option to minimize area at a fixed frequency for each core type using the 45 nm NANGATE standard cell library. Property checking was performed using Mentor’s Questa Formal software, version 2019 4_1.




Fig. 5. Area and gate count for various Ibex variants. The ‘Full’ variant is the full core without PDAT analysis. The rest of the variants, none of which can be generated using Ibex’s elaboration time parameters, are generated using PDAT. The first figure compares various RISC-V ISAs generated from the base ISA. ‘Ibex ISA’ is generated by PDAT when restricting the design to the full instruction set supported by Ibex (i.e., RV32imcz). The second figure shows core variants that support the instructions used by several MiBench benchmark groups. The variants in the third figure are useful variants of the RV32i base RISC-V ISA. ‘Reduced Addressing’ removes register-register instructions (R-type format). ‘Safety critical’ removes JALR, AUIPC, FENCE, ECALL, and EBREAK instructions. ‘No Parallelism’ removes bit-parallel instructions. ‘Aligned’ removes non word aligned memory accesses. The ‘RISC 16’ variant supports the c-extension’s ADD, ADDimm, AND, XOR, LUI, LW, SW, BEQZ, and JALR instructions, making it roughly equivalent to the RiSC-16 ISA [13].

VII. RESULTS

A. Automatic Generation of Reduced-ISA Microprocessors

Figure 5 presents results for some reduced-ISA variants of Ibex not supported by elaboration time parameters. An immediately interesting result is the area difference between the ‘Ibex Full’ (design before application of PDAT) and ‘Ibex ISA’ (PDAT run without ISA subsetting) core variants. By restricting the execution environment to the *full set* of instructions officially supported by the core, we see nearly 10% area savings. This seemingly counterintuitive result (since we have not even reduced the ISA yet!) is due to the inability of standard logic synthesis tools to understand which states are unreachable when only valid ISA instructions are provided as input. PDAT identifies such states, since it explores the state space of the design for a given environmental constraint. The logic corresponding to such states is marked as unneeded by PDAT and subsequently eliminated when the environment is constrained to only valid ISA instructions.

We also see that PDAT-based removal of ISA extensions (again, we consider interesting variants that cannot be generated using Ibex’s elaboration time parameters) results in substantial area and gate count reductions, with the exception of c-extension removal. The RISC-V c-extension includes 16-bit versions of RV32i’s 32-bit instructions. As these instructions are largely different encodings of existing instructions, the marginal resources needed to implement the c-extension are low.

When considering ISA subsets customized for the MiBench benchmark groups discussed in Table I (assuming an embedded setting), we see that the MiBench Networking and MiBench Security subset cores are over 3% and 11% smaller, with 5% and 12% fewer gates, respectively, than the PDAT baseline RV32imc ISA. These results are even more significant when compared against the PDAT Ibex ISA (RV32imcz) variant. In this case, the MiBench All ISA variant generated by PDAT is 15% smaller and has 18% fewer gates than the PDAT-generated Ibex ISA core variant (and 23% smaller with 14% fewer gates than Ibex without PDAT).

For core variants that support ISAs with special properties (rightmost graph in Figure 5), we do not see a significant area or gate count advantage over the RV32i PDAT variant baseline. We see, for example, that restricting Ibex to only word-aligned memory accesses allows over 6% area and 7% gate count savings over the baseline RV32i PDAT variant. Nevertheless, such ISA variants may still be interesting due to safety, reliability, or security reasons.

B. Reducing Obfuscated Designs




Fig. 6. PDAT results for the obfuscated Cortex M0 netlist.

As discussed in Section IV, PDAT can be used to analyze obfuscated cores. Figure 6 shows PDAT results for an obfuscated version of ARM’s Cortex M0 microcontroller. Recall that ARMv6-M, as well as its Cortex M0 implementation, are not modular. So, the studied microcontroller variants cannot be generated automatically without PDAT.

We once again see substantial area and gate count reduction (20%, and 18%, respectively) simply by performing PDAT analysis with the core’s full ISA. Some of the unneeded core area may be attributable to ARM’s obfuscation techniques. Somewhat surprisingly, the ‘MiBench All’ ISA, consisting of all instructions needed to implement the MiBench benchmarks (Table I), has the same area and gate count as the ‘ARMv6-M’ variant. We hypothesize (but are unable to verify due to obfuscation) that this is due to the fact that the MiBench subset includes two and four-byte instructions, as well as indirect branches. As a result, the best way to constrain Cortex M0 for such a subset is with cutpoints (Section IV). However, as the Cortex M0 netlist is obfuscated, we are forced to use port-based constraints, which limits the opportunities from ISA subsetting.

The ‘interesting subset’ is the base ARMv6-M ISA with select instructions removed, based on their relative lack of importance for a scalar, in-order uniprocessor (e.g., memory ordering instructions, inter-core signaling instructions), as well as the multiply instruction, and all seven of the four-byte instructions. As all instructions in this ISA subset are two-byte aligned (the minimum instruction length in the ARMv6-M ISA), this ensures that all branches (direct or indirect)

point to *valid* instructions from the subset. This ‘interesting subset’ is a practical instruction subset for many embedded applications. The Cortex M0 variant that supports this ISA subset has 23% and 20% lower area and gate count, respectively.

C. Scalability

Unlike in hardware verification, state space explosion is not a crippling issue for PDAT since any inconclusive analysis in PDAT’s Property Checking Stage stage simply means that the resulting transformed netlist may be less optimized than if the property’s invariant was proved to hold.




Fig. 7. Area and gate count for various RIDECORE variants.

Figure 7 shows the results of employing PDAT for RIDECORE, which is an order of magnitude larger than Ibex and Cortex M0. None of the studied variants can be generated using elaboration time parameters. Results for RIDECORE are muted compared to Ibex. This is not surprising since, unlike an in-order core such as Ibex, RIDECORE has several large OO-supporting structures such as a physical register file that are largely unaffected when support for an ISA subset is removed. We still see an area improvement of 6% by simply running PDAT with the environment restricted to the full RIDECORE ISA. Other RIDECORE variants show small improvements over the RIDECORE ISA variant in terms of percent area or gate reduction. However, in absolute terms, some of these improvements are in the same range as the improvements for Ibex. For example, Ibex RV32i and RV32e variants have a difference of 934 gates, while the RIDECORE RV32i and RV32e variants have a difference of 1920 gates, over 2× the difference in Ibex.

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As diversity of customers and workloads increases, the need to customize hardware at low cost for different computing needs continues to increase. This work focuses on automatic customization of a given hardware, available as a soft or firm IP, through eliminating unneeded or undesired ISA instructions and instruction sequences. We presented a property-based framework for automatically generating reduced-ISA hardware. Our framework directly operates on a given arbitrary RTL or gate-level netlist, uses property checking to identify gates that are guaranteed to not toggle if only a reduced ISA needs to be supported, and automatically eliminates these unexercisable gates to generate a new design. We showed a 14% gate count reduction when the Ibex core is optimized using our framework for the instructions required by a set of embedded (MiBench) workloads. Reduced-ISA versions generated by our framework that support a limited set of ISA extensions and which cannot be generated using Ibex’s parameterization options provided 10%-47% gate count reduction. We also demonstrate that our framework is applicable to

obfuscated designs. For an obfuscated Cortex M0 netlist, we observe a 20% area reduction and 18% gate count reduction for the MiBench benchmarks over the baseline core. When applying our framework to a 100,000-gate RIDECORE design, we saw 14%-17% gate count reduction, demonstrating scalability.

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